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Abstract 
This paper exploits exogenous variation in the price of child care stemming 
from a major child care price reform, to estimate the effects of child care costs 
on parents’ labour supply. The reform introduced a cap on the price that local 
governments could charge parents, and lead to considerable reductions in the 
price of child care depending on family type and region. Since the price is de-
termined by a handful of observed characteristics, we are able to match house-
holds that are similar in all relevant aspects, but experienced quite different 
price changes due to the reform. Our difference-in-differences regression 
matching estimates are very precise, but mostly close to zero.  
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Subsidized child care has typically been used as a way of increasing labour 
force participation among low-income mothers. For example, subsidized child 
care was one of the components in the major welfare reform implemented in 
the US during the 1990s. In Europe, the supply of subsidized child care as well 
as the level of female labour supply varies tremendously. The Nordic countries 
(excluding Finland) have a well developed child care system with high enrol-
ment rates; over 60 percent of 3-year-olds and more than 70 percent of 5-year-
olds are enrolled in child care centres. The female labour supply in these coun-
tries is also high from an international perspective (OECD, 2001). The question 
is, of course, whether this is a cause or an effect of the developed child care 
system.  
There is a large literature investigating the link between parents’ (i e moth-
ers’) labour supply and the cost for child care; see Anderson & Levine (2002) 
and Blau & Currie (2004) for two surveys. The major problem with the existing 
studies is that information on the true price of child care is typically not avail-
able. Therefore, most earlier studies have used predicted values from a sample 
of households that pay for care. This approach provides a price measure for the 
entire sample, but requires an exclusion restriction to identify the effect of the 
price of child care on labour supply (i e there must exist some variable that ex-
plains the price of child care but not labour supply). The instruments used have 
(in the best cases) been factors that vary across regions, such as the local area 
cost of child care and the average wages of child care workers. As argued by, 
e g, Baker et al (2005) the validity of these instruments is questionable, since 
they might be correlated with the state of the local economy and the area 
wages.
1 Therefore, several recent studies (e g, Baker et al, 2005; Schlosser, 
2005; Berlinski & Galiani, 2004; and Cascio 2006) exploit time and regional 
variation in the access and/or price of child care, due to child care regulations 
or child care reforms, to estimate the effects of the price of child care on mater-
nal labour supply. The major weakness of these difference-in-differences evi-
                                                      
1 Two studies that avoid this problem are Berger & Black (1992) and Gelbach (2002). 
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price of child care might not always be comparable.  
This paper exploits exogenous variation in the price of child care stemming 
from a major child care reform in Sweden, to estimate the effects of child care 
costs on parents’ labour supply. Before the reform, local governments were al-
lowed to set the price of child care freely. Typically, the price varied with re-
spect to the number of children in different ages and to household income, 
leading to substantial variation in the price of child care both between and 
within municipalities.
2 In 2002 there was a major child care price reform, 
which introduced a cap on the price that local governments could charge par-
ents.
3 This made all municipalities impose more or less the same price struc-
ture, where prices varied by type of household in a similar way. The reform led 
to considerable reductions in the price of child care, depending on the area of 
living and the type of household. Since the type of household is defined by a 
handful of observed characteristics, we are able to match households that are 
similar in all relevant aspects, but that experienced quite different price changes 
due to the reform. We exploit this variation to estimate the effect of the price of 
child care on labour supply in a difference-in-differences regression matching 
framework. Since we are able to compare households that are identical with re-
spect to all the child care prices determinants, we hope to overcome some of 
the problems in the earlier difference-in-differences literature. In addition, we 
investigate the effects of child care prices on fathers’ labour supply as well as 
mothers’. Looking at males is important in the Swedish context, since two 
months of parental leave are reserved for fathers and most fathers take some 
parental leave.  
We find that parental labour supply does not seem to depend on child care 
prices; our difference-in-differences regression matching estimates are very 
precisely estimated, but the point estimates are close to zero. In a few cases, 
                                                      
2 Gustafsson & Stafford (1992) exploit this cross-sectional variation in the price of child care for 
two parent households with one pre-school aged child. The child care prices for these families 
differ with respect to household income and municipality. However, since earnings potential is 
closely related to labour supply and since the differences in the price-structures across munici-
palities might reflect differences in labour supply, one might worry that the cross-sectional varia-
tion in the price of child care is not exogenous. 
3 It was voluntary to introduce the new price structure, but since municipalities were compen-
sated for the loss in revenues all but two municipalities did. 
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ever, these effects are not of any economic significance. We can rule out that 
the child care price elasticity with respect to labour supply is greater than 0.02 
for both females and males.  
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section we present some ear-
lier empirical evidence. Then, we provide some institutional background in-
formation about subsidized child care in Sweden, as well as a description of the 
child care price reform that we will exploit to identify the effects. In section 4, 
we discuss our empirical approach, and in section 5 we present the data. The 
results from the empirical analysis follow in section 6. Finally, section 7 con-
cludes. 
2 Earlier  studies 
Economic theory gives a clear prediction regarding the effects of reduced child 
care prices on labour force participation. A reduction in the child care price will 
increase the probability that the wage – net of child care costs – will exceed the 
individual’s reservation wage, and, thus, make it more likely that (s)he choose 
to participate in the labour force. When it comes to hours worked, given labour 
force participation, economic theory cannot determine whether these are likely 
to increase or decrease when child care prices fall. On the one hand, the income 
effect makes individuals work less when child care prices are reduced, but on 
the other hand, the substitution effect works in the other direction given that the 
price is income dependent. Hence, it is an empirical question whether reduc-
tions in child care prices will make parents work less or more hours. Below, we 
will present earlier empirical evidence from the most reliable studies available 
on the effects of the price of child care on labour supply. 
Berger & Black (1992) use US data and compare mothers receiving child 
care subsidies with those on the waiting list for such subsidies. Using a regres-
sion-discontinuity-like approach, they create treatment and control groups that 
are similar in all relevant aspects. However, the treatment group receives sub-
sidies whereas the control group does not. They find positive effects of child 
care subsidies on female labour force participation (subsidized mothers have 
approximately 12 % higher probability of being employed), but no effects on 
hours worked. 
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year olds (kindergarten) on mothers’ labour supply in the US. Since parents 
may choose to hold back their children one year or to enrol them in private 
schools, and since this choice probably is correlated with factors determining 
labour supply, public school enrolment might be endogenous. Gelbach exploits 
the fact that a child’s date of birth decides when (s)he is eligible for kindergar-
ten, and instrument school enrolment with five-year-old’s quarter of birth. He 
finds that both single and married mothers with a five-year old – but with no 
younger child – increase their labour supply (6–24 % for single mothers and 6–
15 % for married mothers) due to public schooling. For mothers with younger 
children, no effects are found, which is reasonable since they still need to ar-
range child care for them.  
Cascio (2006) also analyses labour supply effects of school enrolment, but 
exploits the fact that different states introduced public kindergarten at different 
times. Her difference-in-differences estimates point at large effects on single 
mothers’ labour force participation, given that they had no child younger than 
five; for every ten children enrolled in public school, three mothers entered the 
labour force. She finds no effects for single mothers who have a five-year-old 
and younger children or for married mothers (the latter finding contradicts the 
Gelbach results). 
Two other quasi-experiments studies of the effects of introducing free pre-
school gradually across the country are Schlosser (2005) and Berlinski & Ga-
liani (2004). Schlosser investigates the effects of the 1999-introduction of free 
public preschool for children aged 3 and 4 on Arab mothers’ labour supply in 
Israel. She finds that mothers’ labour supply increased sharply (7 %) and that 
the increase was largest for more educated mothers. Berlinski & Galiani study 
the expansion of preschool for children aged 3–5 in Argentina, and exploit the 
variation in treatment intensity across regions and cohorts to identify the effects 
on maternal labour supply. They find that the programme had a positive and 
statistically significant effect on mothers’ employment.  
Finally, Baker et al (2005) investigate a Canadian reform implemented in 
Quebec 1997.
4 The aim of the reform was to provide child care spaces to all 
                                                      
4 This reform is also studied by Lefevbre & Merrigan (2005a, b). 
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5 Compar-
ing maternal labour supply in Quebec with maternal labour supply in the rest of 
Canada, they find a highly significant effect of reduced child care prices on fe-
male employment with a measured elasticity of 0.24.  
The major shortcoming of the available difference-in-differences evidence 
is that regions with different changes in the access to or the price of child care 
might not be otherwise comparable. In particular, one might worry that house-
holds in regions with large changes in the access to or the price of child care 
differ in unobserved ways from households in other regions. If these differ-
ences are related to labour supply decisions, the estimates might be biased.   
3  Publicly provided child care in  
Sweden 
Since 1995 local governments in Sweden are obliged by law to supply child 
care to children with parents that either work or are full-time students,
6 within 
three to four months from parents’ request.
7 Table 1 shows that most children 
aged 1–5 attend publicly subsidized child care and that non-subsidized private 
alternatives are rare.
8
                                                      
5 The Quebec-reform is similar to the Swedish reform in that a cap on the price was introduced. 
It differs from the Swedish reform in that prices became independent of income. 
6 Besides child care, Swedish local governments are responsible for supplying primary and sec-
ondary education, care for the elderly, individual and family care, infrastructure, as well as some 
cultural activities. The main revenue source is a proportional income tax that the municipalities 
are free to set. Tax revenues constitute about 60–70 percent of total current revenues. The rest is 
made up by user fees and central government grants, where 15–20 percent of total revenues con-
sist of grants. Grants are typically of unconditional lump sum type and are used both for transfer-
ring funds from the central to the local level and for an ambitious equalisation program. 
7 The Swedish National Agency for Education (2001a) 
8 Blau & Currie (2004) note that most earlier studies do not account for the existence of unpaid 
child care options, something that might lead to biased estimates. However, since the use of un-
paid child care in Sweden is rare this is unlikely to affect the estimates. 
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Table 1 Type of care for children aged 1–5, percent 
 1999  2002 
Subsidized care (municipal preschool or family day care homes) 76  85 
Non-subsidized care (relatives, au-pair, etc)  3  2 
At home with parent  18  13 
Other 3  1 
Source: The Swedish National Agency for Education (2001b, 2004) 
 
Until 2002 the municipalities were free to set their own child care prices, as 
long as the prices were “reasonable”. According to Government bill 93/94:11, 
“prices are not allowed to be so high that parents, for economic reasons, re-
strain from letting their children attend an activity that the children would do 
well from attending”. This definition clearly gives room for wide interpreta-
tions, and consequently prices differed considerably between municipalities, 
both with respect to level and construction. In 2002, an option for the munici-
palities to impose a cap (stipulated by the government) on the price was intro-
duced. If municipalities chose to implement this cap they were granted extra 
state fund to cover the loss in revenues. In 2002, all but two municipalities im-
posed the price cap and in 2003 the two remaining municipalities followed.  
The child care price reform consisted of two parts. First, the price of child 
care was determined as a fixed rate of the household income. The percentage 
rates differed with respect to the number and age of the children, with higher 
per-child prices the fewer children in public child care and the younger the 
child.
9 Second, a cap on the price was introduced so that municipalities could 
only charge parents the fixed share of their household income up to SEK 
38,000. Thereafter, the price of child care was constant.  
In January 2003, the price cap was accompanied by an obligation for all 
municipalities to supply 525 hours a year of child care for all children age 4–5 
years free of charge. In all, these changes made the average cost for full-time 
child care decrease from 6 % to 2.5 % percent of the pre-tax household in-
                                                      
9 The fixed per-child percentage rates differed between 1–3 % of household income, and the 
maximum rate was 6 % for those with three children aged 1–5. The fourth child in care was free 
of charge. 
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10 Finally, the reform also involved an obligation for all municipalities to 
supply at least 3 hours a day or 15 hours a week of child care for children 
whose parents were unemployed (implemented in July 2001) or on parental 
leave (implemented in January 2002). 
The main purpose of the 2001–03-reform was to increase the supply of child 
care, thereby giving all children access to the pedagogical activities supplied by 
day care centres, improving the economic conditions for families with children, 
and facilitating parents’ labour force participation. Figure 1 shows that when 
the cap was implemented in 2002, the share of children attending child care in-
creased from an already high level. Wikström (2007) shows that the increased 
attendance rates after the reform are mostly driven by higher attendance rates 
for children to unemployed parents (+18 %) and for children whose parents are 
on parental leave (+22 %).  
Figure 2 shows the female and male employment over the period 1976–
2004. The fraction of females employed is high during the whole period, and 
since the middle of the 1990s, it is only slightly lower than the male counter-
part. Looking at the years 2002–05, i e the period after the child care reform 
took place; we see a decreasing trend in both male and female employment. 
The question is whether the fraction employed fell differently for households 
with different reductions in child care prices. We will attempt to answer this 
question in the empirical analysis.  
Contrary to earlier studies, we will study the labour supply effects of child 
care prices for both mothers and fathers. In Sweden, both parents are entitled to 
generous income support when staying home with young children. In total they 
are entitled to thirteen months of parental leave at a replacement rate of 80 %. 
However, two months of this period are reserved for fathers
11. Eriksson (2005) 
shows that in 2002, fathers with children younger that 17 months on average 
stayed home in 37 days. 82 % of all fathers took some time off to be home with 
their children before the child turned eight years. About 10 % of fathers took 
more than 100 days of parental leave (Ekberg et al., 2004). 
 
                                                      
10 The average cost for full-time child care decreased from 9.7 % to 4 % of after-tax income.  
11 See Ekberg et al, 2004; and Eriksson, 2005 for a description of the parental leave system in 
Sweden and for studies of the effects of the “daddy-month” on mothers’ and fathers’ parental 
leave. 
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Figure 2 Fraction employed, 1976–2004 
 
4 Econometric  method 
The aim of this paper is to estimate the effect of the price of child care on la-
bour supply. Assume that the labour supply for individual i in municipality m is 
given by: 
 
im i i im m im Z X P Y ε δ π β α + + + + = , (1) 
 
where Yim is either a dummy variable for employment status or the share of 
full-time among those who work, αm is a municipality specific intercept, Pim is 
the price of child care per hour, Xi is a vector of household characteristics, Zi is 
a vector of individual characteristics and εim is an unobserved labour supply 
component.  
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which lead to great regional price variation across municipalities. To this, there 
was also substantial within municipality price variation, with the price of child 
care given by a deterministic function of household characteristics (the number 
of children in different ages and the household income). The formula for calcu-
lating the child care price differed between municipalities and could be ex-
pressed as: 
 
) ( i m im X P P = . (2) 
 
Barnow et al (1981) show that unbiased estimates are obtainable if all factors 
affecting both the price of child care and labour supply are quantified and in-
cluded in the model. The exact functional form of Xi in equation (1) is, how-
ever, not known. If the model fails to remove all the direct effect of Xi on Yim, 
the estimates might suffer from bias. The most flexible specification of Xi 
available, is to include dummy variables for all possible combinations of values 
and variables in Xi (saturated model for Xi). Assume that there are J such com-
binations (household types). The model can then be written as: 
 
( ) ijm ij jm j m m ijm Z P Y ε δ γ γ β α + + + + = , (3) 
 
where  γj  is a household type fixed effect and  γjm is a household 
type×municipality fixed effect.
12 This model controls for all the child care price 
determinants in the most flexible way possible. Thus, the price of child care 
fulfils the selection-on-observables assumption, i e that the unobserved labour 
supply component does not vary with the price of child care conditional on γjm. 
Also, failing to control for other determinants of labour supply will not bias the 
estimate (since they do not affect the price of child care). Therefore, we can  
exclude Zij from the model. 
                                                      
12 Many earlier studies exploit cross-sectional regional variation to identify the effect of the price 
of child care on labour supply. However, it is quite likely that municipalities choose the price 
structure as a response to the labour supply for different types of households. Thus, the cross-
sectional regional variation in the prices of child care for a given type of household might be en-
dogenous. To account for the possible endogeniety of the price structure across municipalities, 
we interact household type with municipality.  
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( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] 0 | , | = = jm j m ijm ij jm j m ijm P E Z P E γ γ ε γ γ ε . (4) 
 
LS estimates of (3) will, thus, yield an unbiased estimate of β. However, since 
the price of child care in municipality m is a deterministic function of Xi, there 
is no variation in the price conditional on γjm. Thus, the effect of the child care 
price on labour supply cannot be estimated without additional sources of varia-
tion.  
In this paper we exploit the change in the price of child care due to the re-
form in 2002, to estimate the effect of the price of child care on labour supply. 
As mentioned earlier, before the reform, municipalities were allowed to set the 
price of child care freely, with varying impact of different household character-
istics. The reform imposed a common child care price structure, leading to sub-
stantial changes in the child care price depending on the pre-reform price struc-
ture. Introducing time variation to model (3), yields: 
 
( ) ijmt jt jm j mt m ijmt P Y ε λ γ γ β α + + + + = , (5) 
 
where t = {2001, 2003} indexes years and  λjt is a household type×time effect. 
This is a difference-in-differences regression matching estimator.
13 Note that 
the estimate of β is the weighted sum of J difference-in-differences estimates at 
the household type level, with the weights set to the number of households of 
type j. Thus, λjm and λjt are the municipality fixed effects and a time fixed effect 
for household j, respectively. Below, we will describe how we will match 
households in practise. 
                                                      
13 This is similar to the difference-in-differences matching estimator in Heckman et al (1997) and 
Smith and Todd (2005). 
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5.1  Definitions and descriptive analysis 
We use two data sources; register data from Statistics Sweden and survey data 
on municipal day care prices collected by us.
14 As described in section 4 above, 
we will use data from two years in order to identify the effects of the child care 
price on labour supply; one year before the reform (2001) and one after (2003). 
For each year, we use the entire population consisting of two-parent households 
with at least one child aged 1–9.
15 The price formulas are based on a few 
household characteristics that all are observed in the data, namely year, mu-
nicipality of residence, household income (wages), number of children aged 1–
9, and the age of each child. However, we do not calculate prices using ob-
served wages for several reasons; first, wages might be endogenous and depend 
on hours worked, and second, we do not observe wages for parents who do not 
work. Therefore, we use predicted wages from a traditional Mincer-equation, 
where we control for age, age squared, educational level and type, country of 
birth, parents’ country of birth and parents’ educational level.
16 We run sepa-
rate regressions with respect to gender and time period. Given the information 
on the number and age of the children and the predicted household income, we 
use the survey data on the price-structure to calculate the exact full-time price 
                                                      
14 We collected child care prices via an email-request sent to all Swedish municipalities asking 
for exact formulas on how they calculated prices in 2001–04. We received information about the 
exact price structure from 220 of Sweden’s 290 municipalities. 
15 The reason for focusing on two-parent households is that we cannot, in data, separate unmar-
ried couples without common children from single-parent households. Since prices are based on 
household income, we will not be able to calculate correct prices for these households. In the 
sensitivity analysis we will however investigate if the estimates are affected by including single 
parent households. The reason for focusing on children aged 1–9 is that the share of children at-
tending child care is low for older children, see Figure 1. In the empirical analysis we will inves-
tigate the importance of children’s age further.  Finally, we exclude parents younger than 16 and 
older than 64, since people of that age typically do not participate in the labour force. 
16 Full-time wages are available for all workers in the public sector and for a random sample of 
workers in the private sector. In order to make the estimates nationally representative we weight 
the sample using the sampling weights. We estimate wage-equations for the full sample, regard-
less of whether they have children or not. Results from the wage-equations are available from the 
authors upon request.  
IFAU – Do reduced child care prices make parents work more?  14of child care for each household.
17 In the main part of the analysis we will use 
hourly child care price, defined as the monthly full-time price divided by the 
number hours per month for full-time attendance, as measure of the price of 
child care 
We investigate the effects of prices on two different labour supply outcome 
variables; whether the individual is employed or not and the share of full-time 
conditional on employment. It is not obvious how to measure employment. We 
base the decision on the individual’s observed actual yearly earnings, where we 
define an individual as employed if he/she earns more than 50 percent of the 
minimum wage according to collective agreements.
18 Turning to the other out-
come variable, share of full-time, this is only observed for those employed.
19  
Table 2 gives summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical 
analysis. Three things are worth pointing out. First, there are no large changes 
in average labour supply between 2001 and 2003. If anything, the fraction em-
ployed and the average share of full-time seems to have fallen slightly over the 
period. Second, males typically work full-time, whereas females work fewer 
hours a day. Third, price of child care is considerably lower in 2003, and so is 
the variation across individuals. Given the nature of the reform, where a uni-
versal cap on prices was introduced, this is expected.  
 
                                                      
17 This is done under the assumption that all children aged 1–9 in the household attend publicly 
provided child care. Given that we use predicted rather than actual wages when calculating child 
care prices, one might worry about measurement errors. However, since predicted wage is a gen-
erated variable, the error component is orthogonal to the predicted values by construction. In the 
analysis we use predicted child care prices, which are non-linear transformations of the predicted 
wages. In order to check whether these transformations causes any measurement error problems, 
we have estimated the “first-stage” relationship between predicted child care prices and true 
child care prices for a sample of working parents. We find a point estimate for predicted child 
care prices of 0.99. Hence, measurement errors should not be a problem. 
18 The minimum wages are taken from Skedinger (2005). In 2003 the minimum wage was ap-
proximately SEK 125,000 on a yearly basis. We have elaborated with different threshold values 
as well as letting the thresholds differ by gender, age and education. This did however not change 
the results. 
19 As for the wage data, this information is available for all workers in the public sector and for a 
random sample of workers in the private sector. We use the sampling weights to make these 
numbers nationally representative. 
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*Only for those employed and covered by the wage data (weighted with sampling 
weights). The hourly child care price and predicted household income is measured in SEK. 1 
SEK corresponded in 2003 to 0.11 euro or 0.13 USD. 
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An important assumption in our empirical approach is that we can account for 
all variables that simultaneously determine prices of child care and labour sup-
ply. The prices in both 2001 and 2003 were based on a few household charac-
teristics: the number of children, the age of each child and the household in-
come.
20 All these variables are included in the data. However, the exact func-
tional form of these variables in the labour supply model is not known. To ac-
count for all direct effects of these variables on the outcome, we therefore cre-
ate a set of dummy variables for all possible combinations of values and vari-
ables. We are then able to compare identical households in different munici-
palities before and after the reform. This is analogous to exact matching, where 
each household type in 2003 is matched with a household of the same type in 
2001 in a given municipality.
21 All such pairs of household types are then 
matched to identical pairs in other municipalities. 
In practise, unrestricted exact matching is not possible, since predicted in-
come is a continuous variable. If we were to define the household types down 
to the very last krona, we would soon run out of degrees of freedom. To ad-
dress the dimensionality problem, we have to impose some type of income re-
striction. Therefore, we assume that households with predicted income in the 
same SEK 500-interval are comparable.
22 We thus let households with the 
same number of children, in the same age-categorises, with the same predicted 
income in SEK 500s define a household type.
23 Since we exploit variation in 
the price of child care before and after the reform, we can only use household 
types that appear in both periods in a given municipality. Also, since we will 
compare the change in labour supply and prices before and after the reform, 
                                                      
20 As argued above we will use predicted household income rather than actual income. 
21 We do not want to compare the same household in 2001 and 2003, since both child care prices 
and parents’ labour supply decisions might change as children age. 
22 We have also tried to match households in the same SEK 100 intervals. This reduces the sam-
ple substantially, but do not affect the estimates much. 
23 Arguing that households with the same predicted household income could act quite different 
depending on whether the income is equally generated by the woman and the man or whether 
one of the spouses has higher potential income than the other, we have also matched households 
on variables determining predicted wages (i e own and spouse’s education, own and spouse’s 
age). This does not change the results. 
IFAU – Do reduced child care prices make parents work more?  17 each household type must appear in at least two municipalities.
24 We are able 
to find matches for about 88 percent of the sample.
25 In particular, have not 
found matches for households with many children and households with very 
low or very high predicted household income. Thus, the matching excludes the 
more extreme observations. In all, we have been able to find matches for al-
most 2,500 different household types.  
Since households are matched in SEK 500-intervals, and since the price of 
child care is based on the exact income, there might still be within household 
type variation in the price of child care in a given municipality and at a given 
time. Since the within-municipality variation in the price of child care might be 
endogenous, we take the mean of all variables for each household type for all 
municipalities and periods. Each observation is then weighted by the number of 
observations in each household type and municipality in 2003. This eliminates 
all within household type variation, and the effects are only identified from 
variation in the change in child care prices across municipalities. 
 
5.3 Graphs 
Before turning to the empirical analysis, let us look at some descriptive figures. 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the distribution of child care prices before and af-
ter the reform. The hourly price is typically higher in 2001 than in 2003; in 
2001 some households pay more than 30 SEK per hour, whereas in 2003, no 
one pays more than 15 SEK per hour. There is also substantial variation in the 
price of child care in 2001, while the child care price reform made parents pay 
similar prices in different parts of the country. The spikes in Figure 4 illustrate 
the cap on the price for different number of children.  
 
                                                      
24 However, given that the household type has been found in both periods in a given municipal-
ity, this restriction is much milder. 
25 The corresponding figure for individuals with wage data is 80 percent. 
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Figure 3 Distribution of the hourly child care price, 2001 
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Figure 4 Distribution of the hourly child care price, 2003 
 
Figure 5 illustrates how prices have changed between 2001 and 2003, as a re-
sult of the  child care price reform. There are a few households whose price has 
actually increased, but for the lion share of the households child care has be-
come a lot cheaper. For a typical household, the hourly price of child care has 
decreased with about 8 SEK.
26 The child care price reform, thus, generated 
much variation in the change of the price. Some households experienced quite 
substantial reductions in the child care price, while other (seemingly similar) 
households did not experience much change at all. It is this feature of the re-
form that we will exploit to estimate the effect of child care prices on labour 
supply.  
 
                                                      
26 Note, however, that this is the hourly price at 40 hours of attendance. 
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Figure 5 Distribution of the change in hourly child care price, 2001–03 
 
Both before and after the reform, the price of child care is a function of house-
hold income. This is illustrated in Figure 6 and Figure 7, which show the aver-
age child care price for different household income levels.
27 As can be seen 
from the figures, there is a positive relation between household income and 
price for child care in both periods. In 2003, the graph flattens after 38,000 
SEK, as expected from the price structure imposed by the reform. Also before 
the reform, the correlation between income and price decreases at certain in-
come levels. This is because several municipalities imposed caps on prices 
even before the reform, although the exact income where the cap was imposed 
differed between municipalities (it varied between 22,300 and 73,800). Figure 
                                                      
27 To abstract from any correlations between predicted household income and other child care 
price determinants, the outcomes in Figure 6–Figure 16 have been standardized with respect to 
the number and age of the children in the household. 
IFAU – Do reduced child care prices make parents work more?  21 8 shows how the change in price is related to predicted household income in 
2001. As can be expected from the structure of the reform, it is households with 































30000 40000 50000 60000 70000
Predicted household income 2001 (SEK)
Notes: The figure shows the mean hourly child care price by predicted household income
(in SEK 500 intervals). The price is standardized with respect to the number and age of
the children. The solid lines show the mean +/- 1.96 standard errors.
 
Figure 6 Average hourly price 2001 by predicted household income 2001 




























30000 40000 50000 60000 70000
Predicted household income 2001 (SEK)
Notes: The figure shows the mean hourly child care price by predicted household income
(in SEK 500 intervals). The price is standardized with respect to the number and age of
the children. The solid lines show the mean +/- 1.96 standard errors.
 
Figure 7 Average hourly price 2003 by predicted household income 2001 
 










































30000 40000 50000 60000 70000
Predicted household income 2001 (SEK)
Notes: The figure shows the mean change in hourly child care price by predicted house-
hold income (in SEK 500 intervals). The price is standardized with respect to the num-
ber and age of the children. The solid lines show the mean +/- 1.96 standard errors.
 
Figure 8  Change in average hourly price 2001–03 by predicted household in-
come 2001 
 
Child care prices are determined by the number of children, age of the children 
and household income. Many of these determinants are also closely related to 
labour supply. For instance, most empirical studies on female labour supply 
find a strong positive correlation between employment and the age of the 
youngest child. The same type of underlying relation applies to predicted 
household income as well. Figure 9 and Figure 10 show the fraction employed 
by predicted household income for females and males, respectively. There is a 
strong a positive correlation, indicating that those with highest potential income 
also are those that are working.
28 The pattern is, however, not as pronounced 
for the average share of full-time as shown in Figure 11 and Figure 12. This is 
                                                      
28 This follows from the fact that predicted income is a function of age, and that age is positively 
correlated with employment. 
IFAU – Do reduced child care prices make parents work more?  24especially true for males; they typically work full-time regardless of predicted 
household income.  
Given that many of the child care price determinants are directly related to 
the outcomes that we intend to study, it is crucial to account for all such differ-
ences in the empirical analysis. Otherwise, our estimates might be biased, and 
it is not trivial to say in which direction the bias will go. We address this prob-
lem by matching households that are identical with respect to the determinants 
of the child care price (i e, households with the same number and age of the 
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Predicted household income 2001 (SEK)
Notes: The figure shows the fraction employed by predicted household income (in SEK
500 intervals). The fraction employed is standardized with respect to the number and
age of the children. The solid lines show the mean +/- 1.96 standard errors.
 
Figure 9 Fraction employed by predicted household income 2001, females 
 




























30000 40000 50000 60000 70000
Predicted household income 2001 (SEK)
Notes: The figure shows the fraction employed by predicted household income (in SEK
500 intervals). The fraction employed is standardized with respect to the number and
age of the children. The solid lines show the mean +/- 1.96 standard errors.
 
Figure 10 Fraction employed by predicted household income 2001, males 
 


































30000 40000 50000 60000 70000
Predicted household income 2001 (SEK)
Notes: The figure shows the mean share of full-time by predicted household income (in 
SEK 500 intervals). The share of full-time is standardized with respect to the number 
and age of the children. The solid lines show the mean +/- 1.96 standard errors.
 
Figure 11  Average share of full-time among employed by predicted household 
income 2001, females 
 
 


































30000 40000 50000 60000 70000
Predicted household income 2001 (SEK)
Notes: The figure shows the mean share of full-time by predicted household income (in 
SEK 500 intervals). The share of full-time is standardized with respect to the number 
and age of the children. The solid lines show the mean +/- 1.96 standard errors.
 
Figure 12  Average share of full-time among employed by predicted household 
income 2001, males 
 
To give a first hint of what results we might expect from the empirical analysis, 
the remaining figures illustrate how differences in child care prices relates to 
differences in labour supply.
29 Figure 13 (females) and Figure 14 (males) show 
the average difference in the share employed by the difference in price and 
Figure 15 (females) and Figure 16 (males) show the average difference in the 
share of full-time by the difference in the price. None of the figures show much 
action; at first sight there seem to be no correlation between the changes in 
price for child care and the changes in labour supply. 
 
 
                                                      
29 When constructing these figures we have used the matched sample described in section 5.2. 
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Notes: The figure shows the mean difference in fraction employed by difference in
child care price (in SEK 0.1 intervals). Households have been matched with respect
to the number and age of the children and household income. The solid lines show
the mean +/- 1.96 standard errors.
 
Figure 13  Average difference in employment 2001–03 by difference in hourly 
price 2001–03, females 
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Difference in hourly price (SEK)
Notes: The figure shows the mean difference in fraction employed by difference in
child care price (in SEK 0.1 intervals). Households have been matched with respect
to the number and age of the children and household income. The solid lines show
the mean +/- 1.96 standard errors.
 
Figure 14  Average difference in employment 2001–03 by difference in hourly 
price 2001–03, males 
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Difference in hourly price (SEK)
Notes: The figure shows the mean difference in share of full-time by difference in
child care price (in SEK 0.3 intervals). Households have been matched with respect
to the number and age of the children and household income. The solid lines show
the mean +/- 1.96 standard errors.
 
Figure 15  Average difference in share of full-time 2001–03 by difference in 
hourly price 2001–03, females 
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Difference in hourly price (SEK)
Notes: The figure shows the mean difference in share of full-time by difference in
child care price (in SEK 0.3 intervals). Households have been matched with respect
to the number and age of the children and household income. The solid lines show
the mean +/- 1.96 standard errors.
 
Figure 16  Average difference in share of full-time 2001–03 by difference in 
hourly price 2001–03, males 
 
6 Results 
Before turning to the difference-in-differences matched regression results, we 
will present some very raw difference-in-differences estimates using data ag-
gregated at the municipal level. This can be seen as an illustration of our identi-
fying strategy, and the analysis is comparable to studies that exploit between 
region and time variation only. The idea is to see whether the change in labour 
supply 2001–03 differs between municipalities that made big or small reduc-
tions in the price of child care 2001–03. 
The municipality difference-in-differences estimates are presented in 
IFAU – Do reduced child care prices make parents work more?  32Table 3. We have grouped the municipalities with respect to the average 
change in the child care price 2001–03, and compared the one-thirds of the 
municipalities with the biggest and the smallest reduction in the child care 
prices. In the top panel we calculate the change in child care prices between 
2001 and 2003 for the two groups. For example, the hourly price on child care 
was 10.3 SEK higher in 2001 than in 2003 for the municipalities with the big-
gest reduction, whereas the reduction was 5.2 SEK in the municipalities with 
the smallest reduction. The difference-in-differences estimate for child care 
prices is thus given by the difference of these numbers, i e -0.51 (in 10s SEK). 
In panel B/C we calculate the corresponding changes in the fraction of fe-
males/males employed. The fraction employed fell for both groups of munici-
palities between 2001 and 2003. In the municipalities with the biggest price re-
duction, the fraction females employed was marginally lower in 2003 than in 
2001 (it fell from 0.7073 to 0.7055). In the municipalities with the smallest re-
ductions in child care prices, the fraction females employed fell from 0.7019 to 
0.6939. The difference-in-differences estimate for female employment is hence 
0.0061. The corresponding estimate for males is 0.0037.  
Finally, we compare the difference-in-differences estimate for child care 
prices with the difference-in-differences estimate for fraction employed. This 
produces the Wald-estimates of the effects of child care prices on employment 
presented at the bottom of panels B and C. For females we find an estimate of -
0.0119, and for males -0.0072. Hence, when child care prices increase 10 SEK 
the share of females employed decrease with 1.2 percentage units. None of the 
estimates are however statistically significant from zero. Table 4 presents the 
corresponding analysis for the share of full-time. The differences in the price of 
child care between the groups of municipalities are replicated from Table 3. In 
both municipality groups, the share of full-time increases slightly for women.
30 
However, the difference for females in municipalities with the biggest reduc-
tion in the price of child care is slightly bigger than for females in the other 
municipalities. This generates a difference-in-differences estimate of 0.0021. 
The Wald-estimate of the effect of child care price on the share of full-time is, 
thus, -0.0041, indicating that an increase with 10 SEK decreases the average 
                                                      
30 This is contrary to the overall tendency of a lower share of full-time in the entire sample (see 
Table 2). It is females in the remaining 1/3 of municipalities that is experiencing a slight reduc-
tion in the share of full-time.   
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fect is however not significantly different from zero. For men, the share of full-
time falls slightly for both municipality groups. The reduction was, however, 
somewhat bigger in municipalities with the biggest reduction in child care 
prices, leading to a difference-in-differences estimate of -0.0064. The corre-
sponding Wald-estimate of the effect of child care price on the share of full-
time, is 0.0124, but not significantly different from zero. In all, we are not able 
to find any significant effects of the changes in the price of child care on fe-
male or male labour supply at the municipality level. 
Our formal analysis improves on these simple municipality level difference-
in-differences estimates in several ways. First, we exploit within-municipality 
variation in the change of the child care price. We also make use of all munici-
palities, and not just the 2/3 of the municipalities with the biggest/smallest re-
duction in the price of child care. Together, this will improve the precision of 
the estimates significantly. Second, and more importantly, we adjust for differ-
ences in household characteristics, by matching households that are similar 
with respect to the child care price determinants (the number and age of the 
children and predicted household income in 500s). This will eliminate any bias 
arising from systematic differences in the composition of family types between 
municipalities. Third, we control for municipality fixed effects and time fixed 
effects for each household type. Thus, any time invariant differences in the la-
bour supply of parents in a given household type are adjusted for. Also, any 
common trend in the labour supply of the parents in a given household type is 
removed.  
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ployed 
  Reduction in child care price 2001–03 in the municipality 
  1/3 biggest  1/3 smallest  Difference 
  Panel A: Hourly child care price (10s SEK) 
Year 2003  0.6730  0.6669  0.0061 
 (0.0041)  (0.0043)  (0.0059) 
Year 2001  1.7073  1.1870  0.5202 
 (0.0199)  (0.0185)  (0.0272) 
Difference -1.0342  -0.5201  -0.5141 
 (0.0200)  (0.0185)  (0.0272) 
  Panel B: Fraction employed, women 
Year 2003  0.7055  0.6939  0.0116 
 (0.0044)  (0.0046)  (0.0064) 
Year 2001  0.7073  0.7019  0.0055 
 (0.0045)  (0.0048)  (0.0066) 
Difference -0.0018  -0.0080  0.0061 
 (0.0023)  (0.0037)  (0.0043) 
  Wald estimate of child care price on employment, women 
   -0.0119   
    (0.0083)   
  Panel C: Fraction employed, men 
Year 2003  0.8488  0.8382  0.0106 
 (0.0045)  (0.0061)  (0.0076) 
Year 2001  0.8528  0.8458  0.0069 
 (0.0044)  (0.0062)  (0.0076) 
Difference -0.0040  -0.0077  0.0037 
 (0.0016)  (0.0021)  (0.0026) 
  Wald estimate of child care price on employment, men 
   -0.0072   
    (0.0051)   
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered on municipality within parentheses. 
The municipalities are grouped based on their average reduction in child care prices 2001–03. 
The observations are weighted with the number of two-parent households with children in the 
municipality.  
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  Reduction in child care price 2001–03 in the municipality 
  1/3 biggest  1/3 smallest  Difference 
  Panel A: Hourly child care price (10s SEK) 
Year 2003  0.6730  0.6669  0.0061 
 (0.0041)  (0.0043)  (0.0059) 
Year 2001  1.7073  1.1870  0.5202 
 (0.0199)  (0.0185)  (0.0272) 
Difference -1.0342  -0.5201  -0.5141 
 (0.0200)  (0.0185)  (0.0272) 
  Panel B: Share of full-time, women 
Year 2003  0.7935  0.7953  -0.0018 
 (0.0046)  (0.0055)  (0.0072) 
Year 2001  0.7910  0.7949  0.0039 
 (0.0047)  (0.0049)  (0.0068) 
Difference 0.0024  0.0004  0.0021 
 (0.0039)  (0.0046)  (0.0060) 
  Wald estimate of child care price on share of full-time, women 
   -0.0041   
    (0.0113)   
  Panel C: Share of full-time, men 
Year 2003  0.9725  0.9755  -0.0030 
 (0.0033)  (0.0016)  (0.0037) 
Year 2001  0.9795  0.9762  0.0033 
 (0.0016)  (0.0024)  (0.0029) 
Difference -0.0071  -0.0007  -0.0064 
 (0.0033)  (0.0026)  (0.0042) 
  Wald estimate of child care price on share of full-time, men 
   0.0124   
    (0.0081)   
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered on municipality within parentheses. 
The municipalities are grouped based on their average reduction in child care prices 2001–03. 
The observations are weighted with the number of two-parent households with children in the 
municipality.  
 
6.1 Model  specification 
Let us now turn to the result from the econometric analysis described in section 
4. Table 5 presents the results from a number of different model specifications. 
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results for females and in the bottom panel for males. The first estimate shows 
the effect on the probability to be employed (Employment), and the second es-
timate shows the effect on how much the individual works given that (s)he is 
employed (Share of full-time). 
In column (1) we estimate a simple OLS model for the full sample, control-
ling for municipality and time fixed effects only. These naïve estimates show a 
strong correlation between the price of child care and labour supply, especially 
for women. As argued above, however, many of the child care price determi-
nants might be directly related to labour supply. Hence, these simple estimates 
cannot be given a causal interpretation. Therefore, in the rest of the table, we 
will attempt to control for the direct effects of the child care price determinants.  
In column (2) we add simple controls for the household characteristics that 
are used to calculate the child care prices.
31 This model corresponds to equation 
(1) in Section 4. Adding the price determinant controls, leads to dramatic 
changes in the estimated labour supply effects of the price of child care. The es-
timate for female employment, for instance, is reduced by more than 90 per-
cent. For men, the estimated effect changes sign. The estimates, thus, seem very 
sensitive for adding controls of the child care price determinants. One might, 
thus, worry that these simple controls are too restrictive to purge the estimates 
from any direct effects of the child care price determinants on labour supply. 
Therefore, we will use the most flexible specification available; fixed effects for 
all possible combinations of values and variables in the price of child care func-
tion. This is analogous to exact matching where we match households that are 
identical with respect to the child care price determinants, but that experienced 
different changes in the price of child care due to the reform. Since we are able 
to find matches for 82 percent of the households only, column (3) re-estimate 
the model in column (2) with the smaller sample. This leads to minor reductions 
in some of the estimates, probably since this eliminates some of the more ex-
treme observations.   
In column (4) we add the household type fixed effects to the model. Thus, 
we compare households that are identical with respect to the price determinant 
                                                      
31 The model includes dummy variables for the number of children, dummy variables for the age 
of the youngest child, linear controls for the age of the older children and a fifth order polyno-
mial of predicted household income. 
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in the estimates, especially for female employment. Our preferred specification 
is presented in column (5), where we also let the household type fixed effects 
differ by municipality and time. This is the difference-in-differences regression 
matching estimator, which corresponds to equation (5) in section 4. The esti-
mate is the weighted sum of almost 2,500 difference-in-difference estimates at 
the household type level. Letting the fixed effects differ by municipality and 
time, reduces the estimates even further. The estimated effect of child care 
prices on employment is no longer statistically significant for females, but sig-
nificant for males (at the ten percent-level). The employment effect for men is, 
however, relatively modest; 10 SEK increase in child care prices, which corre-
sponds to a doubling of the price, decreases the probability of employment with 
0.07 percentage points. The economic significance of the estimate is, thus, low. 
The estimates price effects for the share of full-time are not statistically signifi-
cant for either females or males. The reduction in child care prices induced by 
the reform seems to have had no or very small effects on parents’ labour sup-
ply. Table 6 presents the elasticities corresponding to our preferred specifica-
tion in column (5). All the elasticities are low. The largest (and the only one 
that is statistically significant) is found for male employment. However, also 
this one is low; a one percent reduction in child care prices implies a 0.9 percent 
increase in the probability that a man is employed. The price elasticities with 
respect to employment are also precisely estimated, and we can rule out that 
they are higher than 2 percent for either women or men. If we compare these 
elasticities with the one found in the Canadian study (Baker et al 2005), we can 
conclude that the Canadian estimates are much larger (they find an elasticity for 
females on 0.24). 
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specifications 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 




** -0.0029  -0.0019 
  (0.0060) (0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0029) (0.0044) 
Share of full-time  -0.0348
***  -0.0007  0.0007     -0.0027  -0.0037 
  (0.0030) (0.0039) (0.0048) (0.0021) (0.0037) 







  (0.0035)  (0.0029)  (0.0028)     (0.0030)  (0.0038) 
Share of full-time  -0.0029
***  -0.0015     -0.0027  -0.0004   0.0006 
  (0.0012) (0.0026) (0.0029) (0.0011) (0.0019) 
Control variables:       
Municipality fixed effects X X X X X 
Time fixed effects  X X X X X 
Household variables    X  X     
Household type fixed effects        X  X 
- Interacted with municipality          X 
- Interacted with time          X 
Sample:       
All  X  X     
Matched  households      X X X 
Notes: Results from linear probability models. Child care prices are measured in 10s of SEK. 
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered on municipality within parentheses. 
***, 
** and 
* denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. Household variables 
include dummy variables for the number of children, dummy variables for the age of the young-
est child, linear controls for the age of the older children and a fifth order polynomial of predicted 
household income. Matched household indicate that only household types that appear in both 
time periods and in at least two municipalities are included. 
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 Females  Males 
Employment -0.0030  -0.0086
* 
 (0.0069)  (0.0049) 
Share of full-time  -0.0049  0.0007 
  (0.0049) (0.0021) 
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered on municipality within parentheses. 
* 
denote statistical significance at the 10 percent level. 
 
 
Next, we turn to some sensitivity analysis, and thereafter, we investigate 
whether the effects are heterogeneous with respect to age of youngest child, 
education, origin and predicted income. 
 
6.2 Sensitivity  analysis 
Table 7 investigates the sensitivity of the baseline results in column (5). Col-
umn (1) in Table 7 reproduces these results. In column (2) we also include mu-
nicipality specific time trends. This is typically not possible in a difference-in-
differences setting. However, since we have within-municipality variation in 
the price of child care, we can control for the average change in the labour sup-
ply in all municipalities. The estimates are relatively robust with respect to this 
modification. The only change is that the estimate for male employment in-
creases from 0.0067 to 0.0085 and is now statistically significant at the five-
percent level. This means that the statistically significant effect that we found 
for males in the baseline model was not driven by differences in municipality 
trends.  
In column (3) the baseline model is extended to include a number of indi-
vidual variables (the individual’s predicted wage, spouse’s predicted wage, age, 
dummy variables for educational level and dummy variables for country of 
birth). These variables do not enter the price-function, but are typically in-
cluded in standard labour supply models. We argue in section 4 that given that 
we can match households based on all factors that affect the price, and also 
control for these factors in a flexible way, we need not to worry about the in-
clusion of other covariates. With this in mind, the result from column (3) looks 
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slightly smaller standard errors). 
So far we have estimated the models for two parents-households. Doing 
this, we exclude a number of households from the sample. Does this matter? In 
column (4) we investigate what happens if we also include single parent house-
holds in the sample. It turns out that the point estimates remain more or less 
identical to column (1), and so do the standard errors. Hence, focusing on two 
parent-households does not seem to restrict the analysis, and we will keep this 
focus in the rest of the paper. We will, thus, continue to use the model in col-
umn (1) as our preferred specification. 
 
Table 7 DD regression matching estimates – sensitivity analysis 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Females 
Employment -0.0019  0.0004  -0.0005  0.0004 
 (0.0044)  (0.0070)  (0.0042)  (0.0042) 
Share of full-time  -0.0037  -0.0027     -0.0040  -0.0044 




**     -0.0063
* -0.0071
*    
 (0.0038)  (0.0042)  (0.0036)  (0.0038) 
Share of full-time  0.0006  0.0009     0.0008  0.0004 
 (0.0019)  (0.0029)  (0.0019)  (0.0019) 
Control variables:       
- municipality specific trends    X     
- individual characteristics      X   
Sample:       
- Two parents households  X  X  X  X 
- Single parent households        X 
Notes: Results from linear probability models. Child care prices are measured in 10s of SEK. 
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered on municipality within parentheses. 
* denote 
statistical significance at the 10 percent level. The models control for municipality and time spe-
cific fixed effects for each household type. Individual characteristics include predicted wage, 
spouse’s predicted wage, age, educational level, country of birth. 
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Above, we have estimated linear effects of the hourly price. There are however 
alternative measures that might be more informative. In Table 8 (females) and 
Table 9 (males) below we elaborate with different specifications. Column (1) 
reproduces the result from the baseline model. Column (2) adds hourly prices 
squared, to see whether the labour supply effect is non-linear in prices. The ef-
fect for females remains insignificant whereas for males, the effect now be-
comes insignificant.  Column (3) uses log-prices. These do not have any sig-
nificant effect on labour supply, neither for females nor for males. One of the 
effects of the price-cap-reform was that many municipalities choose to give up 
their part-time prices and instead charged parents the same price regardless of 
the number of hours used. Trying to take this aspect of the reform into consid-
eration, column (4) controls for hourly price for the first 20 hours as well as for 
the next 20 hours. Both these measures enter insignificantly. Hence, when 
specifying price differently, the results for females show no action, none of the 
estimates are significantly different from zero. For males, on the other hand, it 
is only the linear specification that is significant from zero. When the price is 
specified any other way, the effect of the price of child care on male labour 
supply is no longer statistically significant. In the rest of the paper, we will, 
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price on labour supply, different price measures, females. 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Employment 
Hourly price, 1–40 hours  -0.0019  0.0133     
 (0.0044)  (0.0112)     
(Hourly price, 1–40 hours)
2   -0.0046     
   (0.0035)     
ln(Hourly price, 1–40 hours)      0.0058   
     (0.0473)   
Hourly price, 1–20 hours        0.0009 
       (0.0041) 
Hourly price, 21–40 hours        -0.0013 
       (0.0024) 
  Share of full-time 
Hourly price, 1–40 hours  -0.0037  -0.0094     
 (0.0037)  (0.0088)     
(Hourly price, 1–40 hours)
2   0.0017     
   (0.0028)     
ln(Hourly price, 1–40 hours)      -0.0524   
     (0.0384)   
Hourly price, 1–20 hours        0.0009 
       (0.0032) 
Hourly price, 21–40 hours        -0.0025 
       (0.0022) 
Notes: Results from linear probability models. Child care price are measured in 10s of SEK. Het-
eroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered on municipality within parentheses. The model 
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price on labour supply, different price measures, males. 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Employment 
Hourly price, 1–40 hours  -0.0067
* -0.0088     
 (0.0038)  (0.0097)     
(Hourly price, 1–40 hours)
2   0.0006     
   (0.0033)     
ln(Hourly price, 1–40 hours)      -0.0542   
     (0.0377)   
Hourly price, 1–20 hours        -0.0033 
       (0.0038) 
Hourly price, 21–40 hours        -0.0034 
       (0.0022) 
  Share of full-time 
Hourly price, 1–40 hours  0.0006  0.0028     
 (0.0019)  (0.0060)     
(Hourly price, 1–40 hours)
2   -0.0006     
   (0.0016)     
ln(Hourly price, 1–40 hours)      0.0158   
     (0.0249)   
Hourly price, 1–20 hours        -0.0003 
       (0.0017) 
Hourly price, 21–40 hours        0.0004 
       (0.0010) 
Notes: Results from linear probability models. Child care price are measured in 10s of SEK. 
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered on municipality within parentheses. 
* denote 
statistical significance at the 10 percent level. The model controls for municipality and time spe-
cific fixed effects for each household type. 
 
6.3 Heterogeneous  effects 
Next, we will study whether the effects are heterogeneous with respect to the 
age of the youngest child, education, origin and predicted income. First, we di-
IFAU – Do reduced child care prices make parents work more?  44vide the sample according to the age of the households’ youngest child and re-
estimate our model. Results from these estimations are given in Table 10 where 
the first column restates the baseline estimates from column (5) in Table 5. 
Column (2) presents the results for households with the youngest child aged 1–
3, column (3) for households with youngest child aged 4–5, and the last column 
for households with the youngest child aged 6–9.
32 We find that some of the 
estimates vary somewhat. For example, there is a negative statistically signifi-
cant price effect on the share of full-time for females with the youngest child 
aged 6–9 years. For these women, an increase in child care prices with 10 SEK 
decreases the share of fulltime with 1.15 percentage points. The effect is also 
significantly lower than for females in households with the youngest child be-
ing 4–5 years (but not for households with even younger children). The effect 
for male employment is primarily driven by males with the youngest child aged 
4–5 year. However, this effect is not statistically different from the effects for 
males with the youngest child in other age intervals.
33
                                                      
32 The reason for dividing the age groups this way is that it follows the price-structure; children 
aged 4–5 are entitled to 15 hours free of charge pre-school in 2003, and children older than 6 at-
tend out of school care only. 
33 We have also estimated the models for households with only one child. These estimations 
bring nothing new to the picture and have therefore been excluded from the text. They are, how-
ever, available upon request. 
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price on labour supply by age of youngest child 
  Age of youngest child: 
  1–9 years  1–3 years  4–5 years  6–9 years 
 Females 
Employment  -0.0019  0.0003 -0.0023 -0.0049 
  (0.0044)  (0.0070) (0.0084) (0.0056) 
Share of full-time  -0.0037  -0.0018  0.0032  -0.0115
** 





  (0.0038)  (0.0075) (0.0077) (0.0050) 
Share of full-time  0.0006  0.0002  -0.0006  0.0023 
  (0.0019)  (0.0027) (0.0041) (0.0037) 
Notes: Results from linear probability models. Child care prices are measured in 10s of SEK. 
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered on municipality within parentheses. 
** and 
* 
denote statistical significance at the 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. The model controls for 
municipality and time specific fixed effects for each household type. 
 
Next, Table 11 investigates whether the effect of child care prices depends on 
educational level or country of birth? Again, the only statistically significant ef-
fect is found for male employment. It seems like the negative labour supply ef-
fect for men is entirely driven by highly educated fathers. This effect is also 
significantly higher than the effect for low educated men at the 10% level of 
confidence. Still, the economic significance of the effects is small; a doubling 
of the child care price decreases employment among high educated fathers with 
1.4 percentage points. When it comes to the labour supply effects for parents of 
different origin, there are not significant differences between native parents and 
parents born abroad.  
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price on female labour supply, by education and origin 
  Low education High education Born in Sweden Born abroad 
 Females 
Employment 0.0119  -0.0046  -0.0035  0.0084 
  (0.0085) (0.0054) (0.0047) (0.0139) 
Share of full-time  -0.0150  -0.0022  -0.0029  0.0117 
  (0.0102) (0.0033) (0.0038) (0.0143) 
 Males 
Employment 0.0007  -0.0136
** -0.0071
* 0.0128 
  (0.0046) (0.0057) (0.0039) (0.0150) 
Share of full-time  0.0006  0.0029  -0.0002  0.0135 
  (0.0030) (0.0026) (0.0019) (0.0109) 
Notes: Results from linear probability models. Child care prices are measured in 10s of SEK. 
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered on municipality within parentheses. 
** and 
* 
denote statistical significance at the 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. The model controls for 
municipality and time specific fixed effects for each household type . Low education corresponds 
to less than three years of secondary schooling and high education to three years of secondary 
schooling or more. 
 
Finally, Table 12 investigates whether the effects are heterogeneous with re-
spect to predicted household income, own predicted wage or spouse’s predicted 
wage. One odd result appears for mothers with own predicted wage below the 
median; a price increase is associated with higher employment. Given the num-
ber of estimates that we have presented, we would, however, expect that one 
out of ten estimates would be significantly at the 10 percent level just by ran-
dom. Thus, we do not interpret this as a causal effect of the price of child care. 
For male employment, on the other hand, a systematic pattern emerges. The 
negative effect of child care prices on employment, seems to be driven by high-
skill households, and is largest for males living together with a high-skilled 
woman, for which an increase with 10 SEK implies a 1.3 percentage points de-
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price on female labour supply, by predicted income levels 
  Predicted household in-
come 
Own predicted wage  Spouse’s predicted wage 
 <  median  ≥ median  < median  ≥ median  < median  ≥ median 
 Females 
Employment 0.0058  -0.0052  0.0155
* -0.0091  0.0024  -0.0097 
  (0.0093) (0.0047) (0.0083) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0058) 
Share of full-time  -0.0237
*  -0.0018 -0.0091 -0.0019 -0.0123  0.0019 
  (0.0135) (0.0036) (0.0099) (0.0036) (0.0078) (0.0036) 
 Males 
Employment -0.0006  -0.0096
** -0.0034  -0.0079
* 0.0053 -0.0134
*** 
  (0.0063) (0.0043) (0.0050) (0.0046) (0.0056) (0.0045) 
Share  of  full-time  -0.0012 0.0007 0.0024 0.0002 0.0000 0.0019 
  (0.0086) (0.0019) (0.0040) (0.0019) (0.0041) (0.0025) 
Notes: Results from linear probability models. Child care prices are measured in 10s of SEK. 
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered on municipality within parentheses. 
***, 
** and 
* denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. The model controls 
for municipality and time specific fixed effects for each household type. 
7 Conclusions 
This paper analyzes the effects of a Swedish child care reform that set a cap on 
the price that municipalities were allowed to charge parents. Using a differ-
ence-in-differences matching regression approach, we compare individuals 
who are identical with respect to all covariates that affect child care prices, but 
live in different municipalities. Thereby, they face rather different changes in 
prices. The estimated effects of child care prices on labour supply are mostly 
statistically insignificant, and in those cases that they are statistically signifi-
cant their economic importance is small. Our results are consistent with the re-
sult in Wikström (2007) that show that the attendance among children with 
working parents has not much changed through the 2002-reform. 
Our results differ from earlier studies that have relied on natural experi-
ments in, e g, Canada, US, Israel and Argentina. This is perhaps not surprising, 
since subsidized child care did not exist in most of these countries before the 
IFAU – Do reduced child care prices make parents work more?  48reforms, whereas highly subsidized child care existed in Sweden already before 
the reform took place. We interpret our results as dependent of the institutional 
setting. In countries with a well-developed and highly subsidized child care 
system, further reductions in the price of child care have small effects on both 
female and male labour supply. Also, this paper improves the empirical ap-
proach used in the earlier studies. Most importantly, since we know and ob-
serve the variables that determine prices, we are able to compare household 
that are identical with respect to these characteristics. 
The weak negative employment effect for – in particular high skilled – men 
is puzzling. The result is, however, stable with respect to model specification, 
for example the inclusion of municipality specific trends, and to different defi-
nitions of household types. We have no reasonable explanation for this effect. 
However, the municipality level difference-in-differences estimates indicates 
that the effect is driven by the fact that men in municipalities with the biggest 
reductions in the price of child care experienced a smaller reduction in the frac-
tion employed than men living in other municipalities. Also, finding effects for 
males are perhaps not as surprising in Sweden, where fathers can, and actually 
do, share the responsibility for taking care of the children. 
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